We’re covering a business model we haven’t discussed in much detail previously today, diving into the railroad industry, though we do have some indirect exposure to Burlington Northern Santa Fe inside the Intrinsic Value Portfolio through our ownership of Berkshire Hathaway.

But I want to look further north, to Canadian Pacific Kansas City, the only railroad to cross three countries in North America. While railroads themselves are mostly exciting to kids, I assure you, the economics and moats of these businesses are equally elating to many value investors.

And just as a quick reminder, this newsletter publication will be moving behind a paywall in 2027, where we can provide even deeper insights to readers on the most interesting opportunities we find in markets. So go ahead and lock in your subscription before prices start to rise by clicking here (you won’t be charged until January).

- Kyle

Epicurus Had a Garden. Where’s Yours?

Members of our Inner Circle convene for Dinner in London

Around 306 BC, famous philosopher Epicurus bought a modest house and garden in Athens and invited a small circle of friends to live, eat, and philosophize together. People came to call his school “The Garden.”

“Of all the things which wisdom provides to make us entirely happy,” he wrote, “much the greatest is the possession of friendship.”

Twenty-three centuries later, he seems to have been onto something. The best investment ideas rarely come from shouting into a crowded forum. You sharpen them slowly, over long dinners, among people you trust to tell you when you’re wrong or when you’re missing perspectives.

Every investor deserves a garden. Come tend ours by joining The Investor’s Podcast’s Inner Circle, our most exclusive community of investors (and the occasional philosopher).

Canadian Pacific Kansas City: A Massive Moat But Where Will Growth Come From?

Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC) owns about 20,000 miles of track and is the only railroad that can run through Canada, the US, and Mexico on a single line. Building a competitor would be extremely difficult. The land, the permits required to lay track, and the hundreds of billions of dollars required to even try make competing pure fantasy. So this business has one of the widest moats I’ve ever looked at.

But a moat doesn’t always correlate with returns. In 2023, Canadian Pacific finished its acquisition of Kansas City Southern for $31 billion, adding a mountain of debt, new shares, and goodwill. Return on invested capital, one of my favourite metrics, plummeted from the near teens to around 7%, and it hasn’t been back to that level since. Per-share results have looked more like Berkshire’s sleepy BNSF than the Canadian Pacific that compounded at nearly 16% for the previous decade.

So which CPKC are we looking at? Is it the world-class railroad about to start compounding again once the merger hangover wears off, or a beautiful but aged network that has turned into a slow-growth utility business? The answer comes down to whether returns on new capital can keep climbing, how a merger between two of its biggest US rivals plays out, and, of course, the price you pay.

What My Four-Year-Old Taught Me About Railroad Schedules

A wooden train set sits in my living room right now. To my son, it is a precision operation. He's four, obsessed with trains, and he has firm opinions about how I push them. Too fast. Too slow. Wrong track. Apparently I don't respect the schedule enough.

I laughed when he mentioned the schedule. But after I’d researched CPKC, I realized he'd accidentally summarized one of the most valuable management ideas in North American railroads. We'll get there.

Two things really pulled me toward this business. The first was Chris Hohn. Daniel recently pitched GE Aerospace partly to clone Hohn's portfolio, and it sent me down quite the rabbit hole. One of Hohn's big ideas is ownership of irreplaceable physical assets: things that can't be rebuilt today at any price. As far as I can tell, his fund owns both Canadian railroads.

The second was my neighbourhood. I live half a block from the Arbutus Greenway in Vancouver, a paved path full of dog walkers, strollers, cyclists, and scooter riders who are clearly late for work. My family and I walk it all the time. Until 2001, the Greenway was a Canadian Pacific rail line.

This used to be CP railway tracks

But after the trains stopped running, the line sat unused for years, and neighbours planted community gardens on the tracks. Then in 2014, CP decided to seek compensation. It sent crews to clear the gardens and prove it still had the right to run trains there. After a few more years of high-profile disputes, the city of Vancouver paid about $55 million for the corridor.

So here you had a railway line nobody was using, in a city openly annoyed with the company, and CP still got its price. That's what the power of owning land nobody else can touch looks like.

The Railroad That Built Western Canada

In 1871, my province, British Columbia, agreed to join Canada on one pretty large condition: the federal government had to build a railroad connecting BC to the rest of the country. Without it, BC was basically a landlocked island, cut off by the prairies and the Rocky Mountains. The federal government handed the keys to the Canadian Pacific Railway to build it out. The railway had ten years to complete the project and did it in five, driving the last spike in 1885.

So when I say BC exists in its current form because of this railroad, I'm not exaggerating. But it wasn't all heroic. Chinese labourers did much of the hardest construction, and many of them died building it, yet the famous photo of the last spike left them out.

CP surprisingly became a sprawling conglomerate, with hotels, ships, an airline, and even a mining business. It was almost something like Canada’s Berkshire Hathaway. In 2001, it split into five companies, leaving the railroad on its own. And for about a decade, it was the definition of mediocre. It needed a push in the right direction.

The five business segments CP split into

Bill Ackman and Hunter Harrison

Railroads track a KPI called the operating ratio, which is the share of revenue consumed by operating costs. Lower is better. Put simply, a 60% operating ratio means a 40% operating margin.

By 2011, CP's operating ratio was around 80%, one of the highest operating ratios in the industry. Bill Ackman felt that if the business could improve this number, he could make a tidy profit. So he built a stake and, being the activist he was, won a proxy fight in 2012 and brought in Hunter Harrison as CEO. Harrison had started in railroading as a teenager and climbed to CEO of Canadian National, CP's arch rival. He was famous for his framework for precision scheduled railroading.

Bill Ackman and Hunter Harrison

Railroaders called the old scheduling method "holding for tonnage." This meant a train left the yard only when it was full, so trains and crews sat around waiting, and customers never quite knew when their stuff would arrive. Harrison flipped it. Trains would run on a fixed schedule, full or not, and customers planned around the railroad. Think of it like a city bus. It doesn't wait at the stop until every seat is filled. It leaves at 8:14, and if you want a seat, you'd better be there at 8:13. Run it that way, and you need fewer buses, fewer drivers, and hopefully you improve the experience for everyone while becoming more profitable.

This one tweak worked extremely well. CP's operating margins went from the mid-teens to over 40%. Ackman reportedly made about $2.6 billion. From 2012 to 2020, earnings per share grew about 26% a year and the stock compounded at around 20%. For a 140-year-old railroad, those are pretty much tech-company growth numbers.

Harrison left for CSX in 2017, and his right-hand man, Keith Creel, took over. Creel also came from CN. So two CN executives showed up and made CP better than CN, which is like a Leafs coach moving to Montreal and winning a Cup. (As a Canucks fan, I'm in no position to judge anyone.)

CPKC CEO, Keith Creel

So the lesson my son keeps teaching me with his wooden trains is simple: Respect the schedule. I never thought this advice from a four-year-old was worth billions of dollars.

How Two Tracks And A Train Make Money

The business model is gloriously simple. CPKC owns track, and customers pay CPKC to move freight. The price depends on a few variables like the amount, distance, and type.

CPKC’s network runs from the Port of Vancouver across the prairies to Montreal and Saint John, then south through the US Midwest to Kansas City, through Texas, over the border at Laredo, and into Mexico's industrial heartland. That's enough track to get from Toronto to Mexico City and back roughly ten times. In other words, that’s a lot of miles.

Roughly half of CPKC’s revenue comes from Canada, with the rest split between the US and Mexico. Their freight falls into three primary buckets:

  1. Bulk Freight, which includes things like grain, coal and potash (about 40%)

  2. Merchandise Freight, such as chemicals, lumber, metals and cars (about 40%)

  3. Intermodal Freight: shipping containers that are stacked two-high (about 20%).

Fascinatingly, grain alone is over 20% of freight revenue. Think about that for a second. Grain ends up in things like your bread, cereal, pasta and beer, so next time you crack a cold one, there's a good chance a CPKC train was involved. I'll drink to that.

How Much Pricing Power Do Railroads Have?

In the second quarter of 2026, volumes were up about 4%, and revenue was up 13% to about $4.2 billion. My first reaction was, "Pricing power! What a business!"

But my second reaction, after reading the report in more detail, was much calmer. Much of the gap came from fuel surcharges. When commodities like diesel rise in cost, railroads pass those costs on. Fuel surcharge revenue jumped 74%, for roughly $258 million in additional revenue. With a record grain harvest, underlying growth was more like mid-single digits.

You can think of it like a landlord raising the rent because their property taxes went up. They aren’t running a better-managed building. They’re passing the bill along. That helps protect railroad margins, but it isn't reliable growth, because eventually the surcharge will fade when fuel gets cheaper. Although at this rate, it might be a while.

As for why trucks haven't displaced railroads: rail is roughly three to four times more fuel-efficient per tonne-mile, and one train takes hundreds of trucks off the road. For long hauls of heavy stuff, like potash from Saskatchewan to the Port of Vancouver, rail wins every time, with the average CPKC train being about a mile and three-quarters long(!)

The Impenetrable Moat

Fact of the day: nobody has built a new major railroad in North America in roughly a century. To build one, you'd need continuous strips of land across three countries that aren’t exactly sending each other a Christmas card this year, plus permits at every level of government. In Vancouver, getting a permit for a duplex takes forever. A new rail line through the Lower Mainland? When pigs fly.

The next step is to fund the project. CPKC carries about $57 billion of property on its books, but that understates the real rebuild cost. Legacy CP track, much of it laid in the 1880s, sits on the books at just $2 million or so per mile. New track likely costs something like $8 million to $20 million per mile today. Including ancillary costs for yards, tunnels, bridges, land, and rail cars, I estimate the replacement cost at $250 billion to $500 billion. And anyone with half a trillion dollars to spend in 2026 has many other places to put that money to work rather than hammering rail spikes into the ground.

But even if you remove the replacement aspect from it, the industry structure still hands CPKC a number of advantages. CPKC enjoys a duopoly with CN in Canada (one of six giant Class I railroads in the US) and a duopoly with Ferromex in Mexico. It also owns assets that are irreplaceable even by railroad standards. Namely, the rail bridge at Laredo, the busiest US-Mexico trade crossing, and an exclusive concession on its main Mexican corridor all the way through 2047.

The Laredo rail bridge

Additionally, it's the only railroad that can move seamlessly in all three countries in North America. Before the merger, moving goods from Mexico to Canada meant two or three railroads and a handoff at each border. Each one providing added delay, cost and risk. But now it's one railroad, one bill, and one throat to choke if things don’t arrive on time.

Captive Customers?

"Great moat" doesn't automatically mean "great pricing power." After all, Berkshire Hathaway’s Burlington Northern Santa Fe has the same type of asset, and its revenue and pretax income have grown less than 3% a year since Berkshire bought it. It has a great moat, but pretty lousy growth.

When looking at CPKC’s customers, I split them into two categories. First, you have the captive shippers, like a potash mine or grain elevator sitting on CPKC's track with no other railroad nearby, who have little choice for long hauls. Many have built their own rail spurs and designed their entire operation around CPKC's schedule. Switching would mean building their own rail connection. Second are shippers with options. They can reach multiple railroads, or are moving a container a short distance a truck can handle.

When I ran CPKC through my customer loyalty framework, it scored very well on things like sunk costs, setup costs and the cost of failure. An automaker running just-in-time production won't risk parts arriving late to save a few percent on freight. Where CPKC scores worst is brand. Nobody picks a railroad by its logo, and I've never seen anyone in a CPKC hoodie or hat.

If we view CPKC through a brand lens, the closest thing CPKC has is its Holiday Train, which tours the network covered in lights, with live music, collecting for local food banks. In 2025, it gathered about 175,000 pounds of food. It’s not really a key part of the thesis, but I thought I’d mention it anyways, because it’s good PR for CPKC, and I know my son would absolutely love to see the train this Christmas.

Regulators do cap some of the upside. In the US, shippers can bring rate cases (though they rarely win), western Canadian grain revenue is capped, and Mexico can set rates or force CPKC to share its track with other locomotive companies to ensure anti-monopolistic practices. But regulation has its place as it helps stabilize the industry. Even with all of this, railroads have still pushed through above-inflation price increases for most of two decades. So the pricing power is real; it just has a ceiling.

Lastly, we return to the operating KPIs. CPKC's operating ratio of about 60% is among the industry's best, and recent train speed, dwell times, fuel efficiency, and locomotive productivity have all improved. Unfortunately, Harrison implemented his playbook at four of the six Class I railroads, so this edge is narrow, but CPKC is still doing a very good job across the board.

My verdict on the moat is that it’s one of the largest I've ever seen. Technology can't disrupt it, and it would be very expensive to replicate. So the real question becomes whether it can still leverage that advantage to generate outsized shareholder returns, or whether this is just BNSF with a larger railway network.

The Kansas City Southern Hangover

In March 2021, Canadian Pacific agreed to buy Kansas City Southern. KCS was the smallest Class I US railroad, but it also owned the main line into Mexico’s industrial hub. Oh, and KCS also owned the Laredo bridge. A month after CP made its bid, CN made its own, topped CP’s price, and Kansas City Southern accepted the higher bid. But regulators need to approve these deals, as they have wide-scale consequences. Regulators ended up denying CN's bid. That opened the possibility back for CP to win, which they did with a $31 billion bid. So far, strategically, it just made so much sense, but financially, it’s been tough on shareholders.

One KPI helps explain why: return on invested capital. Return on invested capital shows how much profit a business earns for each dollar invested in the company. Picture two bakery businesses that each earn $20k a year. But the businesses aren’t equal because one needs to invest $100k to earn that, while the other needs to invest $300k. The former is the better and more valuable business.

For the decade or so before 2022, CP was the first bakery, earning an adjusted return on invested capital in the 14% to 17% range. But after the deal, those numbers have shrunk to 6% to 7% in the last few years. A major reason for this was the acquisition. Invested capital nearly quadrupled while profits less than doubled. The diluted share count also rose by over a third. Finally, the deal added a large pile of goodwill to the balance sheet.

Goodwill is the premium CP paid for Kansas City Southern over the accounting fair value of its net assets. Companies don’t depreciate this number over time, so from a capital-efficiency perspective, it makes the denominator larger and drags return on invested capital down. The hope is that the added value from the acquisition will offset this, but in CPKC’s case, it hasn’t happened yet.

With deals like this, you will see return on invested capital drop, then sometimes rebound. The rebound is the most important part, because most companies never rebound, but a rare deal can push return on capital efficiency to new highs. I’m less convinced now that CPKC will reach their previous numbers, let alone new highs. But some data supports an improvement from current numbers. Margins are recovering, and profits are rising, so there is a path to improved capital efficiency over the next few years.

On top of that, return on incremental invested capital has crept above 12%. This can be a leading indicator that the company is investing capital well, but it would need to hold up for a longer time period to affect the actual return on invested capital number. Management has said they want to return to double-digit returns by 2028. This seems like a stretch, as they’d need to grow above the mid-teens, which seems tough. Reaching 10% by 2030 seems more realistic.

Buybacks and Debt

CPKC bought back 37 million shares in 2025 for about $4 billion, and another 17 million shares or so in the first half of 2026. This has served to chip away at the share count, but I have a few problems with it. First, I think CPKC bought these shares at or above intrinsic value, which doesn’t help much for shareholders who stick around. Second, CPKC funded part of the distributions with new bonds and asset sales, such as the Panama Canal Railway. Borrowing money to buy overpriced stock doesn’t scream top-notch capital allocation to me.

CPKC currently carries about $25 billion in debt, which comes out to 3.2 times EBITDA, in line with railway comps like Union Pacific and CSX. I prefer looking at debt through a free cash flow lens, asking whether a business can pay off its debt with free cash flow over a three-year span. On that basis, CPKC fails, with that figure sitting at 10x.

To be fair, railroads warrant some leeway. Most of the debt is fixed-rate, and operating income covers interest roughly six times. Railroad lenders are comfortable offering long maturities given the stability of their profit streams. One CPKC bond matures in 2115. So the bigger risk right now is refinancing cheap debt raised in 2020 and 2021 at today’s higher rates.

Management and Growth

Keith Creel has been CEO since 2017, making him the longest-tenured CEO of any Class I railroad. I’d say he's an excellent operator, and integrating a railroad across three countries is no small feat. But we have to look at the numbers: since 2023, the stock has compounded at about 4.5% a year, plus a 1% dividend.

What concerns me most is the incentive plan. CP used to incentivize management partly on return on invested capital. After the Kansas City Southern deal, they swapped that for free cash flow. That distinction matters because buying another big railroad should raise free cash flow almost automatically, even if you overpaid. Return on invested capital asks how much you had to spend to get that cash. One incentivizes just getting bigger, while the other rewards getting better. Management says ROIC will return "at the appropriate time."

Insider ownership is thin, too. Creel's actual shareholding is about 0.01% of the company, and I found no meaningful open-market buying. I'd give the incentive structure a B. But put ROIC back in the plan and show me some insider buying along with intelligently timed buybacks, and it's an A+ from me.

Now we get to growth. The unfortunate reality is that most North American railroads have had flat volumes for two decades. Since the merger, CPKC's volumes excluding coal are up about 22%. That outperformance is what helps separate it from the industry.

One of the biggest growth engines is stealing freight share from the trucking industry. Most goods moving between Mexico and the US still go by truck, and CPKC's single line lets it compete on long hauls from Mexico into the US South and Midwest. It's taking share from a trucking industry split across thousands of small operators. Automotive freight grew 19% last quarter as Mexico became a major car-making hub.

Management targets high single-digit revenue growth through 2028. This could happen, but it won’t be a cakewalk. It’s good and steady, but not quite compounder territory. Most North American railroads have had flat volumes for two decades. Since the merger, CPKC's volumes excluding coal are up about 22%. That's what separates it from BNSF.

If they hit revenue targets and margins improve while the share count shrinks, EPS could grow in the low double digits. This is promising, but I still want to see some validation before I make this the base case for the business.

Risk

I’ll outline two risks that I think could affect CPKC. Neither is existential. I think this business model is durable enough to withstand either, but for the thesis to really take off, it would be better if these risks weren’t present.

The first risk is in the proposed Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern merger. This proposed merger would create the first coast-to-coast U.S. railroad. Unsurprisingly, CPKC has asked regulators to reject it, as it would weaken its routes and current partnerships that make its network less valuable. We won’t know if this will pass, as regulators are still mulling it over until 2027.

The second risk is related to trade policy. Canada and Mexico approved the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, but the US declined the invitation. The deal does run through 2036 but requires an annual review. With CPKC being an international business, this exposes it to certain risks that are mainly out of its control.

Intrinsic Value and Investment Decision

So now we get to what to value the business at. I use a simple three-pronged approach based around revenue growth, margins, and a terminal multiple to price the business. In my base case, revenue grows 6% a year, margins tick up to 53%, and the EBITDA multiple drifts down to 15x. That gets me to about C$171 a share in five years.

In the bull case, Mexico takes off, and regulators block the Union Pacific/Norfolk Southern merger, putting the value at about C$235. In the bear case, growth remains depressed, the merger sails through, and we continue seeing trade issues, putting the value at about C$112, roughly today's price, but five years from now.

Weighting the base case at 50% and the others at 25% each gets me about C$172 in five years. Discounted back, my intrinsic value is about C$111 a share. With the stock at about C$135, CPKC trades well above what I think it's worth. So what are we going to do about this business inside the Intrinsic Value Portfolio?

This is a great business, but at the current price, it’s a mediocre investment. So CPKC won’t make it into the Intrinsic Value Portfolio today. I’ll be watching three things that might change my mind and make me reconsider whether I’d want to own this business: return on invested capital going back into the incentive plan, regulators blocking or heavily conditioning the Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern merger, or the stock drifting below C$100. Preferably well below.

To listen to our full discussion of Canadian Pacific Kansas City, or for more company Deep Dives, check out our podcast here.

Updates on our Intrinsic Value Portfolio below 👇

Weekly Update: The Intrinsic Value Portfolio

To discuss stocks daily with Shawn, Kyle, Daniel, and all Intrinsic Value Mastermind Members, apply here.

Notes

  • Wise released its H1 Fiscal 2027 report on Thursday, and the results were good, as I’ve come to expect, with revenue increasing 22.9% YoY and income before tax increasing 9% YoY at a 23% margin

    • Cross-border volume increased 24%, driven by strong growth in the US and APAC. This is ironic, as Wise had its share price punished due to its application for a US Bank Charter. This quarter shows that the charter is not necessary for Wise to grow in the US, but it will help decrease costs for US-based customers once it is approved.

      • Cross-border revenue increased 19%, card revenue increased 43%, and other revenue increased 27%

    • Active customers increased 21%, and customer holdings increased 28%

      • The interest income on customer balances increased 16% YoY. The decrease is due to lower yields.

    • The lower growth in income before tax occurred because operating expenses increased faster than revenue growth. Tech and development grew 51%, servicing grew 40%, marketing grew 46%, G&A grew 41%, and SBC grew over 50%. Since Wise is still in its stated 20%-25% range for interest before tax margin, I’m not concerned, but I’m monitoring.

    • Wise also mentioned that “Wise Europe, Wise’s Belgian subsidiary, has been engaging with the Brussels prosecutor’s office in response to queries about its business. An agreement has now been reached to fully resolve and settle this matter, with no admission of wrongdoing”

  • Nubank reported its Q3 2026 results on Thursday, delivering record net income of $1.1 billion (+31% YoY) on revenue of $6.3 billion (+37% YoY), with an ROE of 32%

    • Customers grew by 3.7 million to 143 million, and monthly ARPAC, average revenue per active customer rose to about $18 from about $17 last quarter

      • Nubank is earning more from each customer, not just adding more. Brazil's activity rate hit a record 86.3% for its seventh straight increase, suggesting cross-selling is deepening relationships. Meanwhile, Mexico (16.6 million customers after its first quarter as a licensed bank) and Colombia (+62%) keep the growth runway long.

    • Credit quality is the main KPI moving in the wrong direction. The 90+ day NPL ratio rose to 7.3% from 6.9% in Q2, while the 15-90 day ratio was roughly stable at 4.9%

      • Coverage of 90+ day NPLs held at 234%, so Nu is reserving in line with rising delinquencies rather than flattering earnings. But unsecured lending (+39%) is outgrowing secured lending (+23%), shifting the mix toward riskier loans. I'm not worried yet, but I'm monitoring it.

    • The cost of deposits fell to 87% of the interbank rate from 89% a year ago, and the efficiency ratio improved to 19.3% from 20.3%. Management tightened its full-year efficiency ratio guidance to 19-19.5% from around 20%

      • This is Nu's low cost-to-serve advantage at work: lower funding costs and operating costs growing more slowly than revenue, even while absorbing the launch of Nu US and Nu Global

  • dLocal reported its Q3 2026 results on Thursday, with TPV up 77% YoY to $18.3 billion, gross profit up 28% to a record $132 million, and record net income of $68 million (+31% YoY)

    • The take rate (gross profit/TPV) was 0.72%, down from 0.99% a year ago but flat compared to Q2

      • Volume is driving the results while monetization per dollar keeps shrinking. This is the first quarter the take rate held flat, but it had help from one-offs (lower advancement costs in Argentina, a cost recovery in Nigeria, and FX hedge gains), so I need to see a few more quarters before saying the take rate has bottomed

    • Operating expenses fell 11% QoQ and grew just 17% YoY compared with 28% gross profit growth, pushing operating profit up 37% to $76 million. Operating profit/gross profit rose to 58%, up from 50% in Q2, the highest level since Q4 2023

      • This operating leverage helps the business even as the take rate falls: more of each gross profit dollar reaches the bottom line. The caveat is that the year-to-date ratio is still 51% compared with 55% last year, and operating profit growth is tracking toward the low end of guidance due to FX headwinds

    • Net revenue retention was 140%, down from 153% in Q2. That's still strong and doesn't suggest customers are moving volume elsewhere, but given dLocal's customer concentration, it's the number I'm watching most closely

Quote of the Day

"I think that the service provided by railroads is so important in many ways. I mean, it’s the right way to move goods around the country to the extent that you can do it. And it’s far, far more attractive in terms of global warming than using trucks, for example. So it will be here, and if we get a reasonable return on the added capital investment – because it will take added capital investment – we’ll do OK."

- Warren Buffett

What Else We’re Into

📺 WATCH: Resisting the Sirens interview with Chris Mayer

🎧 LISTEN: A Layman Thinks About AI by Howard Marks

📖 READ: The Number of Historical All-Time Highs by Perma Realist

You can also read our archive of past Intrinsic Value breakdowns, in case you’ve missed any, here. We’ve covered companies ranging from Alphabet to FICO, TransDigm, Perimeter Group, PayPal, DoorDash, Crocs, LVMH, Uber, and more!

See you next time!

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