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šļø Amazon: Is It Prime Time for Investors?
[Just 5 minutes to read]


I know⦠Amazon is hardly an insider tip.
But take a look at the stock chart, and you might be surprised to see that itās gone nowhere over the last four years.
The business, however, has changed dramatically.
Behind the world-famous storefront, Amazon has built one of the most complex and far-reaching ecosystems in tech ā spanning cloud, logistics, media, and advertising.
Amazon spent hundreds of billions in CapEx, doubled the size of AWS and its ad business, and turned both into two of the most profitable segments in tech. Oh, and they started launching satellites into space.
After building out physical infrastructure in the pandemic-era, Amazon has now entered its next phase: AI and cloud investments.
The question now is whether that strategy will be enough to put the stock back among the marketās top performers and into our Intrinsic Value Portfolio.
Letās dive in!
ā Daniel
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Amazon: Is It Prime Time for Investors?

Amazonās Headquarter in Seattle
Amazon ā Not Just a Retailer
When most people hear "Amazon," they still think of boxes on doorsteps ā a giant digital storefront where you can buy books, tech, clothes, or household items with a single click and near-instant delivery.
But thatās not the business that makes Amazon tens of billions of dollars in profits. Over the past decade, Amazon has transformed from a retailer into a full-stack platform with deep infrastructure across cloud computing, advertising, logistics, and subscription services. And while these segments might look like side businesses from the revenue breakdown, they are the engine of Amazonās growth and profitability.
AWS, Amazonās cloud division, now generates the majority of the companyās operating profit. Advertising, which didnāt even warrant its own revenue line a few years ago, is now generating $55 billion, $20 billion more than YouTube. Prime subscriptions not only bring in billions in recurring revenue but also act as the glue that keeps customers embedded in the ecosystem.
Today, Amazon is less about selling things and more about powering the infrastructure behind digital commerce. Whether itās a merchant using Buy with Prime on their own site, a startup building on AWS, or a brand paying for sponsored placement.
Amazon continuously expands margins, grows network effects, and has turned into a business that looks more like a mix between Microsoft and Google ā not Walmart.
The Amazon Flywheel
When we think about Amazonās success, what comes to mind is its scale and logistics network. But thatās only a consequence of what Bezos really focused on: customer experience. Warren Buffett once said: āThere are certain people you do not want to try to beat at their own game, and certainly Jeff Bezos would be No.1.ā
When I was a kid, ordering something online meant days, sometimes even weeks, of waiting. With that much waiting time, you donāt make impulse purchases.
And donāt get me started on return policies. If the product didnāt arrive as promised, the money was pretty much gone. Amazon changed all of that. Delivery within 24 hours, returns without giving any reason, and of course, lower prices than anywhere else.
Amazon is the definition of high convenience. But how did they get there? A large part of that answer is Amazon Prime.

Prime is Amazonās subscription service that started offering fast and free delivery. Today, itās so much more than just that. Prime addresses every customer out there.
Music, movies and shows, sports, and of course, the good old free and fast delivery. All of that is part of the modern Amazon Prime subscription.
Itās Amazonās behavioral lock-in, the core of a flywheel that drives virtually every part of the business. Over 230 million people are Prime members. They shop more often, spend twice as much, and with 90% retention rates, Prime seems to be uncancellable for its users.
Prime increases order frequency, lowers customer acquisition costs, and makes the marketplace more attractive to third-party sellers, who in turn spend more on advertising to win visibility.
That demand gives Amazon leverage to invest even more in logistics and infrastructure, investments that reinforce the customer experience, creating a self-reinforcing loop ā the Amazon flywheel.
Amazonās Flywheel
The magic of this model is that each segment reinforces Amazonās ecosystem. The advertising revenue, along with Prime subscriptions and AWS profits, funds continued investment in logistics, infrastructure, and customer experience. Faster delivery and better service make Prime more valuable, which keeps customers loyal and further strengthens the entire system.
Itās a loop that never really ends, and itās what makes Amazon so hard to compete with. Other platforms might beat it on price for some products or on a single vertical. But no one has the full-stack integration of subscription, logistics, marketplace, cloud, and advertising at this scale.
AWS ā Amazonās Profit Machine
While Prime focuses on customers like you and me, Amazonās most profitable business is not connected to its marketplace at all. At least not beyond being subsidized by it in the beginning.
Today, it sounds surreal, but not too long ago, Amazon Web Services, or AWS, was part of the āOtherā segment in Amazonās reporting. Today, AWS makes up more than half of the companyās total operating income, despite only being responsible for a little less than 20% of total revenue.
Thatās because AWS runs at 35% to 40% margins, while the retail business only runs at margins in the low single-digits. The international business has even been loss-making in three of the past five years.
Online stores drive revenue but contribute only a small share of profits.
But perhaps I should explain what exactly AWS even does before I dig deeper. AWS is the backbone of the modern internet. It provides cloud infrastructure to businesses and organizations of all sizes, from startups to governments, allowing them to store data, run applications, and scale on demand without owning a single server. Companies like Netflix, Airbnb, NASA, and even Amazon itself rely on AWS to power their digital operations.
Think of AWS as the utility provider for the digital world. Just like you wouldnāt build your own power grid to run a factory, most companies donāt build their own cloud infrastructure. They rent it ā and AWS is still the biggest landlord in town.
And although it doesnāt directly benefit or participate in the flywheel Iāve outlined above, AWS has a strong moat built around switching costs. Once a company migrates to AWS, leaving isnāt easy. Over time, businesses adopt more of Amazonās storage types, data tools, machine learning services, and backup systems, each with its own configuration, retrieval setup, and costs. That makes switching expensive and operationally risky. Itās what industry experts refer to as vendor lock-in, and investors call high switching costs.
Even though Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud have gained market share over the past decade, AWS continues to grow in absolute terms and has maintained a stable share of a rapidly expanding market. Azure and Google Cloud didnāt steal AWSās customers, they onboarded new ones.
Azure onboarded a lot of customers thanks to its strong relationships with big enterprise clients who use its Office products and Windows Server. Azure was simply bundled into a lot of those broader corporate deals.
Google Cloud is the youngest of the three but also quickly catching up in terms of market share and margins. Ultimately, I expect the cloud market to be dominated by five to six players, with the three current leaders continuing to lead the space.
AI Strategy ā Building the Rails, Not the Buzz
Besides AWSās core, itās also becoming the foundation for Amazonās next big bet: artificial intelligence.
But Amazon is taking a different route than its big tech competitors. Amazon is not trying to compete with ChatGPT or build the next large language model (LLM).
At the core of Amazonās approach is a three-layer AI stack: infrastructure, models, and applications. Together, these layers form a platform that enables customers to build, run, and scale AI systems entirely within the AWS ecosystem.
Amazonās Layered AI Approach
1. The Infrastructure Layer: Owning the Compute Stack
At the bottom of this stack is raw computing power. Training large language models like GPT or Claude requires massive amounts of processing, and that has historically meant relying on Nvidia GPUs. But Amazon is now aggressively investing to reduce that dependency.
Itās building out data center capacity and designing its own custom chips. Trainium is used for training deep large language models, and Inferentia for running models at scale.
These chips are already being used in AWS services. Owning the hardware stack gives Amazon pricing control and long-term cost advantages, crucial in a world where compute is the most expensive input in AI.
But for now, instead of saving money, Amazon is spending tens of billions of dollars on AI infrastructure ā including $100 billion in CapEx this year alone. Thatās more than many national infrastructure budgets.
2. The Model Layer: Titan, Nova, and the Bedrock Bet
On top of this infrastructure, Amazon offers a mix of proprietary and third-party AI models. Its Titan family of models supports tasks like text generation and embeddings. The Nova model is Amazonās newest multimodal foundation model, trained to understand and generate both text and images.
But hereās where Amazon differentiates itself: instead of pushing its own models exclusively, it acts as a neutral platform via Amazon Bedrock.

The User Interface of Amazon Bedrock
Bedrock is a managed service that allows enterprise clients to access and fine-tune multiple foundation models from various providers. Those models include Claude by Anthropic, in which Amazon has a $4 billion investment itself; LLaMA by Meta, Command by Cohere, and, of course, Amazonās own Titan and Nova models.
Clients can customize these models using their own proprietary data, all while keeping that data securely inside AWS. That makes Bedrock extremely attractive for enterprises that want to use powerful LLMs without exposing sensitive data or managing complex infrastructure.
Instead of competing with its suppliers, Amazonās model-agnostic approach positions it as somewhat of a middleman. It reminds me a bit of Adobe, which doesnāt try to compete against AI tools, but instead positions itself as the service where institutional clients can safely and legally use these tools for their work.
3. The Application Layer: Embedding AI Across the Ecosystem
The final layer of Amazonās AI strategy is where all the infrastructure and models start to show up in the āreal worldā ā in the tools and products that Amazon delivers to customers and uses internally to optimize its operations.
One of them is Rufus, Amazonās AI-powered shopping assistant. I donāt know about you, but my experiences with digital shopping assistants have always been more than frustrating. Itās about time that AI changed that.
According to Andy Jassy, Amazonās CEO, the long-term vision with Rufus is to be able to offer everything that nowadays only a human in a physical store can deliver. Such as finding the right product based on a specific event like Valentineās Day, or comparing the size of clothes by looking at your order history and the reviews of other shoppers with similar order histories.
Physical Stores ā The Limits of Amazonās Model
Amazon is known as the company that made physical retail obsolete, at least to a certain extent. Nevertheless, it decided to venture into brick-and-mortar stores itself.
In 2017, Amazon acquired the premium grocery chain Whole Foods in a $14 billion deal. This gave Amazon an instant footprint of over 500 high-end stores across the U.S. and Canada.
But the move was also viewed with some skepticism. Amazonās strategy was based on expanding into highly scalable and profitable ventures fueled by the e-commerce machine. This was a venture into a less scalable, low-margin business.
But the main idea was not to turn this into a phenomenal business ā spoiler, that also didnāt happen ā but for the store footprint to serve a dual purpose. They are not just grocery stores, but micro fulfillment centers and product return hubs. Once again, strengthening Amazonās overall ecosystem. And with Whole Foods generating $20 billion in revenue on a small but positive margin, I would still label the acquisition as a success.
That looks a bit different for Amazonās homegrown experiments, like Amazon Go and Amazon Fresh. Go stores, mostly located in urban U.S. markets, use Amazonās āJust Walk Outā technology to create a checkout-free shopping experience. Shoppers scan their app on entry, pick up what they need, and simply leave, with cameras and sensors automatically charging their account.
Itās frictionless and futuristic, but limited in scope and profitability. Amazon has since scaled back Go store expansion, even closing several locations. What worked well, however, is licensing the āJust Walk Outā technology to other retailers.

One of the first Amazon Go Stores
Devices & Alexa ā Bold Bets, Mixed Results
Beyond Amazonās move into physical retail, Amazon also pushed into consumer hardware in an attempt to not only be the No. 1 online store, but also own the interface between customers and its ecosystem.
It has spent the last decade trying to build its own set of hardware touchpoints: smart speakers, doorbells, streaming sticks, tablets, and more. The flagship initiative in that push was Alexa, Amazonās voice assistant, and the family of Echo devices that brought it into peopleās homes.
The idea behind it was promising, a future where people shop, control their homes, consume media, and even handle basic tasks through casually speaking with Alexa.
In terms of reach, the strategy worked. Alexa is one of the most widely adopted voice assistants in the world. Millions of homes have an Echo speaker. But as you could hear from Shawnās āproduct reviewā of Alexa in our podcast episode, the performance of Alexa isnāt as convincing as the sales numbers would suggest.

Due to its technical limits, the majority of Alexa use cases were low-quality tasks such as setting timers, playing music, or checking the weather. Not exactly the type of transactions that add millions of products to Amazon carts or deliver valuable data to Amazon.
And since Amazon priced the hardware at, and sometimes even below, cost to boost adoption, the Alexa division stacked up billions of dollars in losses. But Amazon is not yet ready to give up. According to the New York Post, Amazon has sold around 500 million Alexa devices. If you have such a strong presence in households across the globe, itās only reasonable to double down instead rather than shut it down.
Thatās why Amazon is now launching Alexa Plus, a new version powered by generative AI. Since itās just about to be rolled out, I havenāt had the chance to try it yet, but seeing how far AI applications have come in recent years, I wouldnāt be surprised if this materially improves the Alexa experience. Time will tell.
The device division, and Alexa particularly, seem to be at an inflection point. It still fits Amazonās long-term DNA to build the infrastructure and figure out monetization later. But Amazon is reaching that ālaterā now. Alexa Plus might decide whether we see this division scale back in the future or finally add measurable value to the broader ecosystem.
Capital Allocation ā From Warehouses to GPUs
After discussing all the different parts of Amazonās business, itās time to look at how they impacted Amazonās financials. You probably got a sense of how much money Amazon spends on its ventures. Between 2020 and 2022, Amazon poured over $160 billion into its business. Back then, mostly into its physical infrastructure. The pandemic was a disaster for most businesses, but a (financial) gift to Amazon. Everyone sat at home and ordered online.
So, Amazon doubled down: new fulfillment centers, last-mile delivery stations, robotics, and labor capacity. But just like Nike, Amazon had overestimated the stickiness of this habit.
After the lockdowns, people went back to brick-and-mortar stores, and Amazon was left with overcapacity and higher costs, leading to one of its worst years of capital efficiency in over a decade.
Amazonās CapEx exploded in the pandemic and kept increasing
To its credit, management adjusted quickly. Under new CEO Andy Jassy, Amazon scaled back CapEx in 2023. Not for long, though⦠Just as Amazon wrapped up its pandemic-era buildout, a new priority emerged ā AI. And this investing cycle is even larger.
In 2024 alone, Amazon spent over $80 billion ā most of it on expanding AWS data centers, acquiring more GPUs, and designing custom silicon. That number is expected to climb even further in 2025. If projections hold, this will be the first year Amazon exceeds $100 billion in CapEx.
There are no signs of slowing demand in the AI sector, quite the opposite, and combined with the profitability of companies in the field, I donāt think we are in a 1999-style bubble. Thatās why I view these investments more favorably than the pandemic-era CapEx.
Financials & Valuation ā Improved Mix and Reasonable Price?
Amazonās financial profile has shifted significantly over the past three years. The main catalyst for this change has been the improving mix of high-margin business segments, combined with tighter operational execution following the post-COVID investment cycle.
Operating margins, which dropped to only two percent in 2022 due to overcapacity and cost inflation, have since rebounded to nearly twelve percent in the most recent quarter.
This expansion is largely driven by the performance of AWS and advertising, two segments that now account for the majority of Amazonās operating income, despite making up less than a third of total revenue. AWS reaches margins in the high 30s and continues to operate as Amazonās most profitable unit.
The advertising business, while not broken out in detail, is estimated by analysts to operate at EBIT margins in the range of 40% as well. Even Amazonās retail segments are showing signs of stabilization, with North America retail margins exceeding six percent in 2024, and international retail finally turning profitable.
The share of high margin businesses increases steadily
Free cash flow has materially improved since the 2022 lows as well, though it remains volatile given Amazonās ongoing reinvestments. Thatās why operating cash flow provides a clearer picture, and with figures now exceeding $100 billion, itās clear that Amazon remains a powerful cash-generating business.

The difference between Free Cash Flow and Operating Cash Flow
At the time of my research, Amazon was trading at $190 ā close to 10-year lows based on its price-to-operating-cash-flow ratio. But just a few hours before we recorded the episode and finalized our investment decision, the stock jumped 10%, making the timing a bit unfortunate.
The question now is: how attractive is the stock after that move?
In my model, I broke down Amazonās revenues and profits into its five major drivers. The growth rates for each segment are based on their historical data and a combination of analyst estimates and industry forecasts. In case you missed the physical stores, Iāve put them into the āotherā category due to their little revenue share, slow growth and low-margin profile.
Overall revenue growth comes out slightly below 9%, since the slower growing online stores remain the biggest part of the business in the years to come. However, AWS and advertising, the highest-margin businesses, grow significantly faster and could make up around 35% of sales by 2029. Due to this business mix shift, EBIT can outpace revenue growth significantly.
Itās important to note that if you model out EBIT for each segment and add them up to a total EBIT, it will be slightly higher than GAAP EBIT since you leave out costs that are not directly related to any one of the segments.
This gets corrected in the net income since I account for those costs in the net income conversion ratio. EPS is growing slightly slower than net income due to some dilution that I expect ā around 1% annually.
I donāt want to bore you with the details, so if you want to change some assumptions or see how a faster or slower business mix shift affects the results, you can download the model and adjust the assumptions.
As always, after modelling out 2029 earnings, I apply a range of exit multiples and weigh them with different probabilities. The implied exit multiple I get is 27.5. Discount the price target back with an 8% discount rate, and you get a fair value target in the mid-220s.
That would imply a 10% discount to the current price. However, this would also āonlyā result in an expected return of 9%, on paper. A price between $180ā$190, the range where I started my research, would lead to an estimated return of 12%, which is our threshold for investing.
These are estimated returns based on the model ā returns on paper that can quickly change when assumptions change.
I see Amazonās stock trading significantly higher in five years than today, perhaps outperforming my model through business segments that I couldnāt even cover here. One of those might be Kuiper, which didnāt make it into this newsletter but was discussed by Shawn and me in the Podcast. We want to own Amazon. However, staying consistent with our target return and demanding a margin of safety, we aim for a price in the $180s.
In the last three years, Amazon has traded anywhere from $85 to $235 ā the stock is volatile, and we are optimistic weāll get a chance to buy Amazon with a larger margin of safety eventually. If youāre buying right now, Iām a long way from calling this the wrong move, though!
Weekly Update: The Intrinsic Value Portfolio

Notes
Ulta Beauty reported a solid set of earnings on Thursday, and the stock jumped 15% in response ā finally pushing it into positive territory for the year. Given that the position had grown larger than initially intended, mostly due to it being one of the first added to the portfolio, we used the strong market reaction to reduce it from 7% to 5%.
In hindsight, the original valuation estimate and position sizing were a bit too optimistic. While we still want to own Ulta longer term, itās not our highest-conviction bet at current prices. For the sake of consistency with our views on other holdings, it made sense to take advantage of a day when Mr. Market was likely pulling forward future returns and overreacting to earnings that were good ā but not spectacular.
The position is now in line with our allocations to Adobe and Airbnb, reflecting a level of conviction thatās more consistent across all three companies.
As for the earnings, Ulta beat revenue estimates of $2.8 billion by nearly 2%, reporting $2.85 billion. EPS came in at $6.70, significantly above analystsā expectations of $5.80.
Full-year guidance was also raised, but only slightly, from $11.5 billion to $11.7 billion. While thatās a positive update, a 15% jump in the stock price adds roughly $2.5 billion in market cap, which feels like an overreaction to what was a solid but not transformational quarter. Thatās why we viewed this surge as an opportunity to trim the position, though the primary driver was to remain consistent with our overall sizing discipline.
The results confirm that Ulta continues to see strong demand despite concerns about a weakening consumer and tariffs. Competitors have also posted solid numbers, suggesting the beauty sector as a whole remains resilient.
Quote of the Day
"Take a simple idea and take it seriously.ā
ā Charlie Munger
What Else Weāre Into
šŗ WATCH: First Principles of Valuation with Tim Koller
š§ LISTEN: Professor Galloway and Aswath Damodaran discuss Markets
š READ: The Collection of Shareholder Letters by Jeff Bezos
You can also read our archive of past Intrinsic Value breakdowns, in case youāve missed any, here ā weāve covered companies ranging from Alphabet to Airbnb, AutoZone, Nintendo, John Deere, Coupang, and more!
Your Thoughts
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